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PATENT VENUE AND CONVENIENCE TRANSFER: NEW WORLD
OR SMALL SHIFT?
Paul M. Janicke'
In the wake of a large rise ofpatent infringement suit filings in
the Eastern District of Texas in recent years, critics have
complained that the court is too receptive to such filings and too
reluctant to transfer them to other districts. Accusations offorum-
shopping have been prevalent. However, as long as Congress
provides a plurality of acceptable districts in which cases of a
given type can be filed, lawyers are duty-bound to select the one
perceived as best for their clients; defense counsel are similarly
obliged to try to move the case to a place seen as more hospitable
to the defendant's positions. It is then up to the courts themselves
to sort out venue in light of existing provisions of law, notably the
convenience transfer provision of28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Normally a
matter of judicial discretion, some recent decisions refusing
transfer ofpatent cases have been reversed for abuse of discretion.
The present article studies the questions of (i) whether, prior to the
recent cases, the Eastern District of Texas held onto civil cases
more often than other courts; and (ii) whether the district kept
more patent cases than other high-patent-volume districts did.
Both are answered essentially in the negative. The court has
transferred civil cases generally, and patent cases in particular, as
often or more often than the average for all federal courts
nationally.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been some changes of late in convenience transfer
law, especially as relating to patent infringement suits. The
1 HIPLA Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. Author of
Modern Patent Litigation, Carolina Academic Press. Thanks to many
practitioners for their helpful inputs to this article, especially to Jack C.
Goldstein and Paul Krieger.
1
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Eastern District of Texas has been the focal point for much of the
judicial attention. Rulings on motions to transfer patent cases out
of that district have risen slightly. In the twelve-month period
ending June 30, 2009, there were thirty-two such rulings,2 ten
grants and twenty-two denials. The majority of these rulings, nine
of the grants and sixteen of the denials, occurred in the later half of
the period, very likely reflecting the accelerated pace of transfer
motions in the wake of a Federal Circuit ruling on the subject of
convenience transfers that came down on December 29, 2008.'
However, as a proportion of total patent case terminations,
including all settlements, transfers still occupy about the same
portion as before, at 3.7%. Moreover, the success rate for a
contested transfer motion has actually dropped slightly, to 31%.
The recent spate of mandamus decisions from courts of appeals
on convenience transfer rulings has triggered an inquiry into the
transfer experience of a few prior years in patent cases. Has
something happened that caused unease in the courts of appeal
about venue choice in patent cases? In particular, was the Eastern
District of Texas holding onto a disproportionate number of patent
cases, or civil cases generally? This article investigates those
questions.
2 Docket Navigator Home Page, https://www.docketnavigator.com/ (last
visited Oct. 9, 2009). This new service allows searches of many types of docket
events in patent infringement cases throughout the country. For this search I
counted only contested rulings, eliminating stipulated transfers. I did not count
magistrate recommendations per se, but only rulings by the district judge. Also
I did not count motions that were denied as "moot" or denied "with leave to
renew."
3 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008), in which a writ
of mandamus was granted, as discussed in detail later herein.
4 Federal Judicial Center Home Page, http://www.fjc.gov (last visited Oct. 9,
2009). The Federal Judicial Center's database for civil terminations treats a
transfer as a termination for the transferring district, even though the case is still
alive in another court. See also Inter-University Consortium for Political and
Social Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research,
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2009).
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The first recent appellate foray into the area, In re Volkswagen
of America Inc.,6 known as Volkswagen II for reasons that will
later become apparent, was a product liability action against a car
manufacturer stemming from a highway accident in Dallas. The
suit was properly brought in the Eastern District of Texas, but was
transferred on convenience grounds to the Northern District by the
Fifth Circuit sitting en banc.' The second case, In re TS Tech USA
Corp.,' was a patent infringement action brought in the Eastern
District of Texas against an Ohio-based auto parts vendor. The
Federal Circuit ordered it transferred, again for convenience
reasons, to the Southern District of Ohio.9 Since TS Tech the
Federal Circuit has had further occasion to look at transfers by the
mandamus route, as will be detailed herein.
These decisions raise important issues about the reach of a
district court's discretion in deciding convenience transfers under
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).'o They also raise the question of whether the
Eastern District of Texas had been unduly holding onto patent and
other civil cases. Here, the question is investigated through
comparing the proportion of transfers out of that district, in patent
cases and civil cases generally, to the proportions in other districts
and the federal system as a whole.
The rulings in Volkswagen II and TS Tech attracted
considerable attention in light of the large increase in the
proportion of patent suits filed in the Eastern District of Texas in
the last five years: rising from 20 filings (0.81%) in 2000," to 161
(6.0%) in 2005,12 to 311 (11.2%) in 2008.13 It is now the district
545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 1336 (2009)
[hereinafter Volkswagen Ill.
Id. at 319.
551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) [hereinafter TS Tech].
9 Id. at 1323.
10 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) (2006) provides: "Change of venue. (a) For the
convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court
may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have
been brought."
1 Lexis CourtLink, figures for fiscal year 2000.
12 Id., figures for calendar year 2005.
3 Id., figures for calendar year 2008.
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with the largest number of patent suit filings in the United States.14
Adverse commentary and Congressional proposals to limit patent
venue have followed. 5
Some have observed in Volkswagen II and TS Tech that the
judges in the Eastern District of Texas might be fueling increased
filings through unreasonable and persistent refusal to transfer civil
cases out of the district when requested by defendants.16 That view
appears to lack basis. Information drawn from federal databases
demonstrates that for fiscal years 2005, 2006, and 2007, the
proportion of civil cases transferred out of the Eastern District of
Texas was considerably higher than the national average for all
federal districts. 7 The proportion of patent cases transferred was
also higher than the national average in 2005 and 2007, and nearly
the same in 2006."s In 2008 the results continued largely the same
14 The next three districts for such filings are now Northern California, Central
California, and Delaware. Source: Lexis CourtLink data for calendar 2008.
1 See, e.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants And Claim Construction: An
Empirical Study Of The Meteoric Rise Of The Eastern District Of Texas As A
Preeminent Forum For Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193 (2007). In
Congress, as part of patent reform efforts begun in 2005, several bills have
proposed severe limits on venue in patent cases by changing the definition of
corporate residence for such cases from the present definition of any minimum-
contacts district, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2006), to more limited choices. See, e.g.,
S. 3818, 109th Cong., § 8 (2008) (limiting corporate residence for patent cases
to state of incorporation or where the corporation has a regular and established
place of business); H.R. 1908, 110th Cong., § 11 (2007) (limiting corporate
residence, for purposes of venue in patent cases, to (i) district of principal place
of business or (ii) a district where a substantial portion of infringing acts
occurred and the corporation has an established physical facility constituting a
substantial portion of its operations).
See, e.g., Barnes & Thornberg Intellectual Property Group, Escape From
Texas: Federal Circuit Ruling May Prompt More Transfers ofPatent Cases Out
of the Eastern District of Texas, MONDAQ BUSINESS BRIEFING, Jan. 7, 2009 (on
file with the North Carolina Journal of Law & Technology) (arguing that
transfer motions in the past "have been routinely denied by the Eastern District
of Texas"); Jason A. Crotty, Transfer Motions In the Eastern District of Texas
After Volkswagen and TS Tech, available at http://www.mofo.com/news
/updates/files/ 15238.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2009) (arguing that before the
recent cases the Eastern District "rarely granted motions to transfer.")
7 Infra, Table 1.
is Infra, Table 6.
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way, with transfers of civil cases generally, and patent cases in
particular, significantly higher in the Eastern District of Texas than
the averages for all districts. 9
II. THE LAW OF VENUE
A. Venue in Civil Cases Generally
The current civil venue statute was enacted in 1988,20
amending prior law to specify that the residence of a defendant
domestic corporation for venue purposes not only would be the
state of incorporation, as before, but also any district with which
the corporation had minimum contacts of the type that would be
sufficient for in personam jurisdiction if that district were a
separate state.2 1 A foreign corporation can be sued, as before, in
19 Infra, Tables 1, 6.
20 See PL Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, § 1013, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(2006)). The act specified that for venue purposes a corporation was deemed to
reside in any district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the
action is commenced.
21 See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (2006), which provides:
For purposes of venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a
corporation shall be deemed to reside in any judicial district in which it
is subject to personal jurisdiction at the time the action is commenced.
In a State which has more than one judicial district and in which a
defendant that is a corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time an action is commenced, such corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any district in that State within which its contacts would be
sufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction if that district were a
separate State, and, if there is no such district, the corporation shall be
deemed to reside in the district within which it has the most significant
contacts.
The venue test is thus similar to, but not the same as, the test for in
personam jurisdiction. See 17 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL.,MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 110.03[ 4 ][c] (3d ed. 2009) ("In states with more
than one judicial district, venue is determined by considering personal
jurisdiction with respect to each district rather than to the state as a
whole.").
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any district where the state-wide minimum contacts needed for in
personam jurisdiction can be met.22
Given the operational scope of most large business entities
today, the current corporate venue statute is often easy to satisfy in
nearly every district. Businesses want their goods and services to
be sold nationwide, in an attempt to do business everywhere.
Techniques like internet advertising and online sales accentuate
those wishes and add to a firm's contacts with all districts. While
such contacts still need to meet a minimum threshold,2 3 most venue
disputes involving large corporate defendants in practice come
down to a decision on convenience transfer.
B. Venue in Patent Cases
Until 1988, patent venue was determined by the special venue
provision of Section 1400(b) of the Judicial Code,24 which was
much more restrictive than the general venue statute. An accused
patent infringer, then and now, could be sued in his state of
residence, but residence was narrowly defined as only the state of
2See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (2006) (providing that for venue purposes "an
alien may be sued in any district"). The constitutional minimum-contacts
requirements would still need to be met for exercising personal jurisdiction over
an alien entity. For discussions of the large body of law relating to those
requirements, see, e.g., Diane S. Kaplan, Paddling Up the Wrong Stream: Why
the Stream of Commerce Theory Is Not Part of the Minimum Contacts Doctrine,
55 BAYLOR L.REv. 503 (2003) and Recent Case-Eleventh Circuit Holds That
Minimum Contacts With the United States Do Not Automatically Confer
Jurisdiction Over a Defendant Served via a Nationwide Service of Process
Statute, 111 HARV.L.REV. 1359 (1998).
23 See, e.g., Brian Covatta, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: An
Introduction, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 265 (1998) (arguing for tailoring of
decisions to the nature and impact of particular web contacts); Sean M. Flower,
When Does Internet Activity Establish the Minimum Contact Necessary to
Confer Personal Jurisdiction? 62 Mo. L. REv. 845 (1997) (suggesting that the
specific nature of internet contacts should determine their sufficiency).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2006) provides: "Any civil action for patent
infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides,
or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and
established place of business." The language of this section has not changed, but
the definition of "resides" was greatly expanded by the 1988 amendment to 28
U.S.C. § 139 1(c).
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incorporation.25 Accordingly, most pre-1988 patent cases laid
venue under the alternative provision of Section 1400(b), in a
district where the defendant had a "regular and established place of
business" and had committed at least one act of infringement.26 In
1988 Congress amended the general venue provision, Section
1391, in a manner that clearly (though perhaps unintentionally)
affected the patent venue provision as well. Congress redefined a
corporation's residence "for purposes under this chapter."2 7 A
corporation's residence was now to be broadly defined as any
district where it would have minimum contacts sufficient to
support personal jurisdiction. This had the effect of mooting the
special patent venue provisions, at least for cases filed against
corporate infringers.2 8 Plaintiffs no longer needed to invoke the
alternative of regular and established place of business plus an act
of infringement. Usage of that method vanished from the patent
litigation scene.
Concomitantly, corporate defendants after 1988 sensed a
heightened need to invoke the convenience transfer provision of
the Judicial Code as the only viable way to escape a forum they did
not like. The Eastern District of Texas was one such forum. It has
25 See Flowers Indus., Inc. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 835 F.2d 775, 776 (11th
Cir. 1987) (under then-existing venue statute, a corporation resides only in its
state of incorporation). The court cited for this proposition Suttle v. Reich Bros.
Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948). See also Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 346 F.2d
890, 892 (5th Cir. 1965), in which the court said, based on Suttle, that it was
well settled that for venue purposes a corporation's residence was limited to its
state of incorporation.
26 See supra note 23.
27 Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 1013(a), 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1391
(2006)). Chapter 87 of Title 28, U.S. Code runs from § 1391 through § 1413,
thus embracing § 1400 on patent venue in its range.
28 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2006). Where individuals or non-corporate entities
are named as defendants or co-defendants, the special patent provisions of
Section 1400(b) continue to apply and to make a difference because the
corporate residence redefinition did not affect such parties. They continue to be
suable for patent infringement only (i) where they reside (in the normal sense of
the word), or (ii) where they have a regular and established place of business
and have allegedly committed an act of infringement.
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almost uniformly been seen as more pro-plaintiff and more pro-
patent than any other in the country,2 9 a proposition I do not intend
to challenge. Rather, the purpose of this article is to determine
whether this district, perceived this way, has been harder to exit
than other districts by the mechanism of convenience transfer.
III. THE HOLDINGS IN VOLKSWAGENH AND TS TECH
A. Volkswagen I
Volkswagen H is popularly called by that name to distinguish it
from the 2004 Fifth Circuit convenience-transfer mandamus case
now known as Volkswagen J.3o The two cases are unrelated.
Volkswagen II was a product liability case brought by Ruth
Singleton, the driver of a 1999 VW Golf, and by her husband
Richard who was in the passenger seat. Both claimed their injuries
sustained in a collision with another vehicle were due to the faulty
design of their Volkswagen.3 1 Their daughter Amy was also a
plaintiff in the case. Amy was not in the car but claimed wrongful
death of her seven-year-old daughter Mariana, who was killed in
the accident.3 2 Volkswagen of America, a New Jersey corporation,
and its parent, Volkswagen AG of Germany were named as
defendants.
The Singletons' car was struck from behind by another vehicle
on a Dallas highway.33 The impact spun the Volkswagen around
and pushed it onto the highway shoulder, where it struck, rear first,
29See, e.g., Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An
Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a
Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193 (2007); Julie
Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 2006,
at Cl.
3o ln re Volkswagon AG ,371 F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004) [hereafter Volkswagen
1]. This case also arose out of an auto accident and was brought in the Eastern
District of Texas, alleging design defects in the car. It will be discussed in more
detail infra note 55 and accompanying text.
31 In re Volkswagen of America, Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 307 (5th Cir. 2008).
32 id.
33 id.
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a flatbed truck parked there.34 The dual impacts were alleged to
have pushed the grandfather Richard's seatback rearwards to a
fully reclined position, where it crushed Mariana who was riding in
back.3 ' The little girl was taken to a hospital but died shortly
afterward.3 6 The other vehicle's driver, Colin Little, was not
initially named as a party to the action.37
The complaint was filed in Marshall, Texas, in the Eastern
District, some 150 miles from the Dallas location, in the Northern
District of Texas, where the accident occurred. At the time, the
Singletons were residents of Plano, Texas," a city within the
Eastern District but only about 20 miles from Dallas. Volkswagen
filed a third-party complaint against Mr. Little in the Marshall
action, asserting that all the injuries were due to his faulty
operation of his vehicle.3 9 Mr. Little resided in the Dallas suburb
of Garland, Texas, also in the Northern District.40
Volkswagen moved for a convenience transfer to the Northern
District of Texas, asserting that the car in question was purchased
in Dallas; that the accident occurred there; that Dallas was nearer
to the plaintiffs' homes than Marshall; and that key witnesses-the
police investigating the accident, ambulance drivers, and hospital
personnel involved in treating the Singletons and their
granddaughter-were all in Dallas.41 In short, Volkswagen argued
that there was no connection to Marshall.
The district court denied the motion, giving two main reasons:
(i) the significant weight to be given a plaintiff's choice of forum,
and (ii) the fact that Marshall, while farther away than Dallas for
the witnesses identified by Volkswagen, was not an especially
34 [d.
35 Id. at 319-20.
6 [d. at 307.
3 Id.
38 Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 2006 WL 2634768 (E.D.Tex. 2006)
at *2.
39 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 307.
40
41 Singleton, 2006 WL 2634768 at *3.
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inconvenient town to get to from Dallas.42 The court also
referenced certain public-interest factors relating to the Eastern
District, e.g., that the same model of Volkswagen was being sold
there and that the citizens of the district had an interest in knowing
if it had a faulty design.43 Hence, concluded the court, the case had
some local overtones, and therefore would not place an unfair
burden upon Marshall residents who may have to sit as jurors in
the case.44
Upon reconsideration, the district court amplified and adhered
to its ruling.45 Volkswagen challenged the ruling by seeking a writ
of mandamus from the Fifth Circuit to direct the district judge to
transfer the case.4 6 Initially the appeal was assigned to a panel
which ruled 2-1 against the writ, mainly on the ground that a
convenience transfer was a matter of judicial discretion, not an
absolute right, and hence was inappropriate for mandamus.4
However, that opinion was withdrawn, and rehearing before a
different panel led to the writ being granted.4 8 Rehearing en banc
was then ordered, and the writ was granted by a vote of 10-7.49
Citing several errors committed by the district court, the full court
found that the district judge had clearly abused his discretion in
refusing transfer."o The appellate majority held that the judge
should not have given any independent weight to the plaintiffs
choice of forum," which it viewed as merely placing the burden of
proof on the defendant to show that another district was more
42 Id. The court also noted that the Dallas witnesses, being located within the
state, were within trial subpoena reach pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3). Id
43 Singleton, 2006 WL 2634768 at *4.
4 4 d.
45 See Singleton v. Volkswagen of America Inc., No. 2-06-CV-222 (TJW),
2006 WL 3526693 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
46 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 308.
4 7 In re Volkswagen of America Inc., 223 Fed. Appx. 305, 307 (5th Cir.
2007).
48 In re Volkswagen of America Inc., 506 F.3d 376 (5th Cir. 2007).
49 In re Volkswagen of America Inc., 545 F.3d 304 (5th Cir. 2008), cert.
denied, 129 S.Ct. 1336 (2009).
5o Id. at 318.
5i Id. n.10 ("A plaintiffs choice of forum, however, is not an independent
factor within the forum non conveniens or the § 1404(a) analysis.").
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convenient.52 The court found that any of the various convenience
factors that carried weight were transferred to the Northern District
of Texas in Dallas.5 3 The court noted the more certain subpoena
power of the Dallas court for issuance of deposition and trial
subpoenas.54 It also referred to the 100-mile "threshold" rule for
inconvenience that it had established in Volkswagen L" Adding
this rule of thumb to the trial subpoena power of a federal district
court under Rule 456 seemed to persuade the Court of Appeals that
there was no good reason for keeping the case in Marshall. The
seven-judge minority expressed the view that no showing of abuse
of the trial court's discretion had been made, especially under the
tighter constraints of a mandamus proceeding.5 7
The majority's lengthy opinion in Volkswagen II did not accuse
the district judge of any particular bias toward keeping cases in the
52 Id. ("Although a plaintiffs choice of venue is not a distinct factor in the
venue transfer analysis, it is nonetheless taken into account as it places a
significant burden o the movant to show good cause for the transfer.").
5
, Id. at 316-18.
54 Id. at 316-17. The district court had noted that for witnesses having to
travel more than 100 miles to trial, subpoenas for their attendance might be
subject to motions to quash, but that the court could deny such motions. See
also Singleton v. Volkswagen of Am. Inc., 2006 WL 2634768 (E.D.Tex. 2006)
at *2 (weighing this factor in favor of transfer since compliance with subpoenas
to attend in Dallas could not be quashed).
5 Id. at 318 (citing Volkswagen I, F.3d 201 (5th Cir. 2004). Volkswagen
instituted the convenience-transfer mandamus proceeding in. Volkswagen I to
exit the Eastern District of Texas in favor of the Western District where the
accident actually occurred. A three-judge panel granted the writ. Volkswagen I,
371 F.3d at 203.
5 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(3),directing courts to quash subpoenas to non-
parties that require them to travel within the state but more than 100 miles from
where they live or work to attend trial, if such travel subjects the witness to
"substantial expense").
5 Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 319-23 (King, J., dissenting) ("In order to grant
mandamus here, the majority proceeds by plucking the standard 'clear abuse of
discretion' out of the narrow context provided by the Supreme Court's
mandamus precedent and then confecting a case-not the case presented to the
district court to satisfy its new standard. Notwithstanding almost two hundred
years of Supreme Court precedent to the contrary, the majority utilizes
mandamus to effect an interlocutory review of a nonappealable order committed
to the district court's discretion.").
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district when they should go elsewhere." However, the opinion
could lead one to speculate whether that is what induced the Court
of Appeals to issue a writ of mandamus. The present article
attempts to determine whether any such systematic bias existed.
B. TS Tech
Shortly before the Fifth Circuit decided Volkswagen II en banc,
the same Eastern District of Texas judge ruled on a convenience
transfer in a patent infringement case, In re TS Tech USA Corp.59
In that case, the appeal route was not to the Fifth Circuit, but
rather, to the Federal Circuit.60
The patent in suit involved automobile seat headrests. The
defendants, TS and its parent company, sold the headrests to
Honda for installation in its vehicles.' No party involved in the
case was incorporated in Texas or even had an office there.62 The
defendants did, however, have arguable contacts with the Eastern
District of Texas through their sales of headrests destined to be
installed on cars to be sold in the district.63 The defendants
identified four of their employees as key witnesses, three from
See generally Volkswagen II, 545 F.3d at 304.
59 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
60 All appeals in patent infringement suits go to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006). Interlocutory rulings in
such cases are subject to review by that court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006).
The Federal Circuit has held that it has authority under the All Writs Act to issue
a writ of mandamus to correct clear abuses of discretion in cases where it would
have appellate jurisdiction. See Mississippi Chem. Corp. v. Swift Agric.
Chemical Corp., 717 F.2d 1374, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that the Federal
Circuit has mandamus power to correct clear abuse of discretion); Baker Perkins
Inc. v. Werner & Pfeiderer Corp., 710 F.2d 1561, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding
that the Federal Circuit has mandamus power where appeal route is to the
Federal Circuit).
61 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
62 The plaintiff, Lear Corporation, was based in Southfield, Michigan; TS
Tech USA was based In Reynoldsburg, Ohio; its parent company, TS Tech
Canada, was based in Ontario, Canada. Id. at 1318.
63 Id.
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Ohio and one from Canada.64 The defendants moved for a
convenience transfer to the Southern District of Ohio."5 The
district court denied the motion.66 It conceded that Ohio would be
more convenient for the four employee witnesses identified by the
defendants, but was "not persuaded to give great weight" to this
factor.6 The judge noted that defendants had not discussed other,
non-party witnesses, and, thus, considered any inconvenience to
non-party witnesses a neutral factor.68 As for documentary
evidence, the court said such evidence today is usually in
electronic form and hence is as convenient to access in one place
as another.69 The judge expressed his view that because the sale of
the headrests at issue occurred within the Eastern District citizens
of the district "have a substantial interest in whether acts of
infringement have occurred in this District."'0 All factors
considered, the court found the defendants had not sustained their
burden of showing good cause why a transfer was necessary.71 The
defendants petitioned the Federal Circuit for mandamus.
The Federal Circuit took up the mandamus petition shortly
after the Fifth Circuit decided Volkswagen II.72 The Federal
Circuit panel was strongly influenced by the Fifth Circuit decision,
citing Volkswagen II fourteen times in its opinion.73 The panel
found, as had the majority in Volkswagen II, that the trial court
clearly abused its discretion in not sending the case to Ohio. After
a brief review of public and private convenience factors in the
case, the panel stated, "there is no relevant connection between the
actions giving rise to this case and the Eastern District of Texas
except that certain vehicles containing TS Tech's headrest
64 Lear Corp. v. TS Tech USA Corp., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105072, at *6
(E.D. Tex. 2008).
6
1Id. at *1.
66 Id. at *9.
67 Id. at *6.
68 Id.
69 Id. at *7
70 Id. at *8
7i Id. at *9.
72 In re TS Tech USA Corp., 551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
See generally id.
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assembly have been sold in the venue."74 This, it said, was
insufficient to keep the case in the Eastern District, when "[n]one
of the companies has an office in the Eastern District of Texas; no
identified witnesses reside in the Eastern District of Texas; and no
evidence is located within the venue."
Once again there was no explicit suggestion of a generic
problem in the Eastern District with regard to holding too tightly to
its civil cases. Still, there are hints that such a view might have
been at work. Where an intervening appellate decision like that of
the Fifth Circuit is given such significant play in the later decision,
the appellate court might have been expected to remand to give the
district judge an opportunity to consider the intervening case,
especially inasmuch as the matter is a discretionary one. That did
not happen in TS Tech. Instead, the Federal Circuit issued a writ of
mandamus commanding a convenience transfer.76 It again seems
appropriate to look at the record of the Eastern District of Texas on
transfers, and in this instance specifically in patent cases.
IV. PRIOR TO VOLKSWAGEN IIAND TS TECH, How DIFFICULT
HAS IT BEEN TO TRANSFER OUT OF THE EASTERN DISTRICT?
The electronic database created each year by the Federal
Judicial Center (FJC) in Washington, DC, called the Federal Court
Cases Integrated Database, allows researchers to examine all civil
terminations during a given fiscal year. The Integrated Database
is prepared and available for research in the following manner.
From data reported by the district clerks, the Center compiles a
database of some 240,000 rows, one for each civil case terminated
74  d. at 1321.
7 Id.76 Id at 1323. No reported decision to that effect has been found. It is
possible that the court has issued such a writ in an earlier case in an unpublished
order.
77 The database is maintained by the Inter-University Consortium for Political
and Social Research at the University of Michigan. It is available online to
researchers from participating institutions, primarily universities. See ICPSR
Web Site, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/ (last visited Dec. 3,
2009).
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in a given fiscal year, with each row containing, inter alia,
information on the mode of disposition of the case, such as trial-
based judgment, motion-based judgment, settlement, or transfers."
By sorting through the integrated database for a given fiscal year,
we can readily find out how many cases in a given district were
transferred to other districts.
One weakness of the FJC database is that it does not
distinguish between transfers on convenience grounds and
transfers where venue was completely lacking in the initial forum.
Another is that it does not reflect whether or not the plaintiff
opposed the transfer, or even instigated it.79 Yet another weakness
is that the Federal Judicial Center's data do not reflect how many
transfers were sought during the years in question, but only how
many were granted. It is certainly possible to conceive a first
district that defendants generally regard as hostile to them,
generating many hundreds of transfer motions, and a second
district of equal business volume that is regarded as fairly
balanced, generating only a few requests for transfer. Hence the
fact that the first district transfers, say, five percent of its cases and
the second only two percent does not resolve issues of overall
fairness issue in the administration of justice. Notwithstanding
these shortcomings, the database represents our only vehicle for a
large-scale look at transfers from federal district courts in civil
cases.
A. Civil Cases Generally
We first look at the proportion of transfers of all types of civil
cases out of the Eastern District of Texas in relation to its total
civil caseload, and compare this to (i) what has happened in all
federal district courts nationally and (ii) to what has occurred in
each of several large litigation districts. The national comparisons
7 For each terminated case, the database also identifies the court, civil action
number, type of case, date of termination, and many other data items relating to
the case.
79 This could occur, for example, where the plaintiff has related cases pending
in another district and wishes to move the one under consideration to that district
for efficiency and cost reasons.
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for fiscal years 2006 and 2007 (the latest years currently available)
are shown in Table 1:
Year E.D. Tex. E.D. Tex. All districts All districts
total civil transfers total civil transfers
dispositions dispositions
2005 3,038 287 271,753 10,027
[9.4%] [3.7%]
2006 3,014 226 273,192 1,043
[7.5%] [3.8%]
2007 2,919 237 239,678 9,651
[8.1%] [4.0%]
2008 3,048 245 234,121 9,141
[8.0%] [3.9%]
Table 1
As seen, prior to Volkswagen II and TS Tech the Eastern
District of Texas had been transferring a significantly greater
proportion of its civil docket to other federal districts than the
national average. A view that it was impossible, or nearly so, to
get a case transferred out of the Eastern District appears
unsupported. However, as with all statistics, care should be taken
not to read too much into them. In theory, it is possible that the
Eastern District was so obviously pro-plaintiff that a great many
defendants sought to get their cases out of the district, and that
even more of them than shown in Table 1 should, as a matter of
good administration of justice, have succeeded. We do not know
how many transfer motions were made and denied. As will be
seen later, we do know something about that for patent
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infringement cases, but it cannot be deduced from the FJC
database.
Before leaving the subject of transfers in all kinds of civil
cases, we should compare the Eastern District's transfer rate with
that of other major litigation districts. For that purpose I have
chosen the Central District of California, the Northern District of
Illinois, and the District of New Jersey." The results are shown in
Tables 2 through 5.
District Total civil Transfers Percent
dispositions transferred
C.D. Cal. 13,944 382 2.7
N.D. Ill. 8,027 219 2.7
D.N.J. 6,412 345 5.4
E.D. Tex. 3,038 288 9.5
Table 2 (2005)
District Total civil Transfers Percent
dispositions transferred
C.D. Cal. 11,732 412 3.5
N.D. Ill. 7,432 181 2.4
D.N.J. 6,433 412 6.4
E.D. Tex. 3,014 226 7.5
Table 3 (2006)
' As will be seen later herein, the selection was driven by the fact that these
are all, in addition to being large-volume civil venues, heavy patent litigation
districts. See Tables 7-9 infra.
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District Total civil Transfers Percent
dispositions transferred
C.D. Cal. 11,491 478 4.2
N.D. Ill. 7,169 227 3.2
D.N.J. 6,557 358 5.5
E.D. Tex. 2,919 237 8.1
Table 4 (2007)
District Total civil Transfers Percent
dispositions transferred
C.D. Cal. 12,008 661 5.5
N.D. Ill. 7,378 167 2.3
D.N.J. 6,413 345 5.4
E.D. Tex. 3,048 245 8.0
Table 5 (2008)
Once again, no endemic urge to hold onto cases can be seen
from these figures. The Eastern District of Texas has been
transferring more of its civil cases than the national average of
federal districts and more than the three districts chosen for
comparison in this study. We do not know how often such
transfers were sought.
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B. Patent Cases in Particular
We now turn to patent infringement cases." Here we have the
same Federal Judicial Center (hereafter FJC) database to draw
upon, but we are also aided by a new data service from Stanford
Law School that enables researchers to reach into docket sheets of
patent cases by using key words.82 This will allow us to gain some
insight not only into the number of transfers granted, but into the
proportion of transfer motions granted and denied, something we
were not able to do for civil cases generally. The FJC data for
patent case transfers from all districts
of Texas are shown in Table 6.
and from the Eastern District
Year E.D. Tex. E.D. Tex. All districts All districts
total patent patent total patent patent
dispositions transfers dispositions transfers
2005 72 10 2,708 138
[13.9%] [5.1%]
2006 128 5 2,782 115
[3.9%] [4.1%]
2007 206 26 2,777 167
[12.6%] [6.0%]
2008 267 20 2,980 142
[7.5%] [4.8%]
Table 6: Patent Case Transfers
s As used herein, this category also includes declaratory judgment actions
commenced by potential infringers. The Federal Judicial Center's databases do
not distinguish between these and infringement suits, since both are
jurisdictionally based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006).
82 The Stanford service is called LexMachina and is available to researchers
free of charge, at http://lexmachina.stanford.edu. It collects data from docket
sheets of courts around the country in intellectual property cases, i.e., those
involving patents, trademarks, copyrights, or trade secrets. It is unrelated to the
Federal Judicial Center's database, although each is drawn from the same
original court information.
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Patent dispositions were fairly modest in 2005 for Eastern
Texas. The district had not fully caught attention as a preferred
district at that time. For fiscal year 2006 we see the Eastern
District transferring to other districts about the same proportion of
its patent cases as the national average, and for 2007 significantly
more. However, the 2007 figure includes ten patent infringement
suits filed by the same plaintiff, Ronald A. Katz Technology
Licensing L.P., against various defendants, all of which were
transferred." If these are thought of as a single large dispute, the
Eastern District figure would be reduced to 17 transfers, or 8.3%,
still higher than the national rate of transfer for patent cases. In
2008 the picture was much the same, with Eastern District of
Texas transferring a greater proportion of its patent cases than the
federal system as a whole.
We now look at transfer rates from the three other districts
considered earlier, for the latest three fiscal years for which FJC
figures are available. In this instance the selections of comparator
districts are not quite as arbitrary, since all three are high-volume
patent litigation districts.84 The comparisons are shown in Tables 7
through 9.
District Total patent Patent Percent
dispositions transfers transferred
C.D. Cal. 274 11 4.0
N.D. Ill. 143 8 5.6
D.N.J. 99 7 7.1
See, e.g., Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing L.P. v. Amer. Elec. Power Co.,
Civil Action 5:05-cv-00188 (E.D. Tex.), docket item 110 (reflecting transfer to
the Central District of California); Ronald A. Katz Technology Licensing L.P. v.
Citibank N.A., Civil Action 5:06-cv-00182 (E.D. Tex.), docket item 335 (same).
84 At present, the Central District of California is the #3 district for patent
filings, Northern Illinois is #8, and New Jersey is #7. See Inter-University
Consortium for Political Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb
/ICPSR/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
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E.D. Tex. 128 5 3.9
Table 7 (2006)
District Total patent Patent Percent
dispositions transfers transferred
C.D. Cal. 273 18 6.6
N.D. Ill. 133 5 3.8
D.N.J. 153 9 5.9
E.D. Tex. 206 1785 8.3
Table 8 (2007)
District Total patent Patent Percent
dispositions transfers transferred
C.D. Cal. 307 12 3.9
N.D. Ill. 143 10 7.0
D.N.J. 187 7 3.7
E.D. Tex. 267 20 7.5
Table 9 (2008)
8 This treats as a single ruling the transfer of ten cases filed by the same
plaintiff, Ronald A. Katz Technology, to the Central District of California.
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For 2006, the Eastern District was somewhat lower in its rate
of patent case transfers, but not very much so. For 2007, its rate
was higher than that of any of the other three districts; and it would
have been higher even if the ten transferred Katz Technology cases
were counted as only one case. For 2008, Eastern Texas continued
to transfer more of its patent cases than the other districts studied.
Unless one assumes the district should be transferring much more
of its patent docket than other districts do, the data do not suggest
any inordinate holding of patent cases in the district.
While the FJC databases do not allow calculation of transfers
in relation to the number of transfers sought, but only in relation to
the total civil dispositions of the district, that problem can be
largely cured by recourse to Stanford's LexMachina intellectual
property database. By keyword searching patent case docket
sheets, rulings refusing to transfer patent cases were identified.
The results, using the FJC figures for transfers granted and the
Stanford figures for transfers denied, are tabulated below for the
same two years developed earlier, fiscal 2006 and 2007,6 as Table
10.
District Patent Patent Success rate
transfers transfers
granted refused
C.D. Cal. (2006) 11 3 79%
C.D. Cal. (2007) 18 7 72%
N.D. Ill. (2006) 8 2 80%
N.D. Ill. (2007) 5 1 83%
D.N.J. (2006) 7 1 88%
D.N.J. (2007) 9 1 90%
86 Federal fiscal years begin on October 1 and run until September 30 of the
following year, taking the latter as the identifying year date. See 2 U.S.C. § 631
(2006).
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E.D. Tex. (2006) 5 8 38%
E.D. Tex. (2007) 17"8 8 68%
Table 10: Motion Success Rates
The rate of granting transfer motions in 2006 in patent cases
was generally lower in the Eastern District of Texas than in the
other districts." For 2007 if the ten Katz cases transferred had
been filed as a single case and transferred, the Eastern District
transfer grant rate would drop to 47%, which would still have been
lower than the rate for other courts, but closer.
The number of patent cases in which transfer is sought does not
correlate very well to the perceived attitudes about results obtained
in patent cases for particular districts. Eastern Texas, thought to be
strongly pro-patent,89 saw 568 patent cases filed in the two-year
period 2006-2007,90 and transfer motions were filed in only 47
(8.3%) of the cases. In Central California, a notoriously poor
district as a patentee-plaintiff's forum,9' 571 patent cases were
nonetheless filed during the two-year period 2006 and 2007.92
Transfer motions were filed in 39 of them, or 6.8% of the cases.
We would have expected much greater disparities in transfer-out
attempts in the two districts than were actually seen. Part of this
may have been be due to the perception that it was impossible, or
nearly so, to get a patent infringement case transferred out of the
Eastern District of Texas,93 a view which as shown herein has little
validity.
8 See supra note 85.
18 See supra Table 10.
89 See, e.g., Leychkis, supra, note 15.
90 Sources: For 2006, Admin. Offc. of U.S. Courts, table S-23; for 2007,
Lexis CourtLink.
91 For example, in fiscal year 2006, thirteen summary judgments were granted
in that district in patent cases, all for the accused infringer. Only two cases
made it past summary judgment to trial. See Federal Judicial Center, Integrated
Data Base, 2006. 215 patent cases settled that year. Id.
92 Lexis CourtLink data, http://www.lexisnexis.com/courtlink/online.
93 See, e.g., Leychkis, supra, note 15.
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V. TRANSFERS IN THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,2009
Fiscal year 200894 is the latest for which Federal Judicial
Center figures are available. The Volkswagen II decision came
down from the Fifth Circuit on October 24, 2007, so there were
about eleven months in which we could watch for changes in the
district's transfer rulings. At the end of the fiscal year the district's
transfer rate for all civil cases stood at 8.0%, slightly lower than
the year before, while the national rate stood at 3.9%, likewise
slightly lower than in 2007. For patent cases, the Eastern District
of Texas had a transfer rate of 7.5% in fiscal year 2008, with the
national average for patent transfers that year at 4.9%. It is
therefore difficult to see any early significant impact of
Volkswagen in how the Eastern District functioned on convenience
transfers soon after that case came down.
TS Tech was decided on December 29, 2008, after the close of
the 2008 fiscal year. Accordingly, for rulings in the year ended
June 30, 2009, as stated at the beginning of this article, the new
Docket Navigator service was used.95 As mentioned, in the Eastern
District of Texas ten patent cases were transferred on contested
motions and twenty-two transfers were refused. The success rate
for patent transfer motions, 310%, is actually the lowest of any of
the years studied. Total patent dispositions by the district for that
time period are not yet known,96 but would be expected to be about
the same as in fiscal 2008, i.e., around 267." That would mean an
overall 3.7% transfer rate out of the district, also lower than in any
of the prior years studied.
Patent venue disputes involving the Eastern District of Texas
continue to emerge.
94 The federal government's fiscal year ends September 30.
95 Docket Navigator-Patent Litigation Research, www.docketnavigator.com
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
96 The Federal Judicial Center database for fiscal 2009 will not become
available until around June 2010.
97 Federal Judicial Center Integrated Database, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
icpsrweb/ICPSR/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2009).
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that the overall proportion of patent cases
transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas has not changed in
the past year. Still, the situation has changed with regard to the
likelihood of success of a motion for a convenience transfer motion
out of that district. In a patent infringement case in Eastern Texas,
the chances are now 31% for getting a favorable ruling on a
contested convenience transfer motion.
In the wake of Volkswagen II and TS Tech, an increase in
transfer motions is to be expected. Practitioners representing
defendants will take heart that transferring out of the Eastern
District, which they thought nearly impossible, at least in patent
cases, is actually quite possible. As seen above, the perception of
impossibility is not supported by the data. We may expect that a
flurry of transfer motions will not change things very much. One
such attempt, a mandamus effort in the Federal Circuit, has already
failed.98
This piece does not address the underlying fairness issues
generated by a patent venue statute that permits a patent
98 See In re Telular, 319 F. App'x. 909 (Fed. Cir. 2009). A patent
infringement case was brought in the Eastern District of Texas by a resident of
Dallas (Northern District of Texas) against six corporate defendants, most being
headquartered at various places on the east coast and one in Illinois, the district
court again decided to keep the case in Marshall, rather than transferring it to
Illinois as requested by one of the defendants, Telular. Gelman v. ADT Security
Services, Inc., 2008 WL 4280351 (E.D. Tex. 2008). Telular had its principal
offices in Illinois and said two of its witnesses were in Georgia and one in
Illinois. The district court said Telular had not outlined the testimony of its
Illinois witness or explained why they were important. Nor had it explained
why the Georgia witnesses would find Illinois more convenient than Marshall.
Documentary evidence, the court said, could be easily transported to Marshall.
Upon denial of its motion, Telular sought mandamus from the Federal Circuit to
order the district court to transfer the case to the Northern District of Illinois.
This time the Federal Circuit backed the district court, finding no clear abuse of
discretion, because the choice of Marshall was not irrational. Telular, 319 F.
App'x at 912. The following month the court denied another mandamus effort,
this time by Volkswagen, to move a patent case against several auto makers
from Eastern Texas to the Eastern District of Michigan. See In re Volkswagen
of America, Inc., 566 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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infringement case to be filed in virtually any district in the country.
Judges are human and often have differing philosophies of how the
country should function and where the balance should be struck
between competing economic and social interests. When dealing
with statutes written in general terms like "negligence" or, in
patent law, a "person skilled in the art,"99 different people can in
good faith, come to different conclusions on the same facts. This
is true as well for venue transfers, where weighing a number of
imponderables like the convenience of a group of persons not yet
fully identified to attend proceedings on dates not yet determined,
and then deciding whether a movant has carried its burden of
persuasion for transfer, has proved an exercise in something less
than mathematical precision.
A few things are clear. One is that as long as Congress allows
a wide choice of districts in which a particular type of action can
be brought and allows the plaintiff, rather than a neutral public
official, to make the initial determination of where to sue, forum
shopping by plaintiffs' counsel will continue. It is not to be
blamed on the lawyers, who are duty-bound to select the district in
which they think their clients have the best chance of prevailing.
Another clear point is that defendants who file transfer motions to
exit what they perceive as an unfavorable forum are doing just as
much shopping as the plaintiffs have done by filing there. For
large corporate defendants making transfer motions, no one
seriously thinks they are really driven by "convenience" factors.
They too are forum shopping and should not be blamed for it. If
we really want fairness and a choice of forum that is not based on
perceived better chances of winning, we may be approaching the
day when cases having an interstate character will be assigned to
districts by an official of the federal court system, much the way a
district clerk assigns cases among the several judges of the district
today.
99 See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
